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LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE 
John Tienson 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0321 
The notion of linguistic competence as a cognitive system that 
produces knowledge not antecedently present in the mind of the sub-
ject, e.g., knowledge of grammatical relations in response to certain 
stimuli is an important contribution to philosophical understanding of 
linguistics, and of cognitive psychology in general. This notion has not 
been as well received as it should have been, in part because of certain 
false things that have been said about it. In particular, it has been said 
that a grammar of a language, conceived as a theory of linguistic compe-
tence, is an idealiza tion, and that speakers know the rules of the correct 
grammar of their language. This paper shows that a theory of compe-
tence is not in any interesting sense an idealization, and that although 
a theory of linguistic competence, i.e. a grammar, aims at describing 
some real aspect of speakers, there is no reason to suppose that this is 
an aspect that would make it appropriate to say that speakers know the 
rules of the grammar. 
t t t 
Chomsky (1957) produced a revolution in linguistics, 
perhaps the only real scientific revolution in our lifetime. 
Transformational grammar was a theory of a new kind, much 
of it concerning subject matter on which there had been vir-
tually no theory at all. Questions that had scarcely been asked 
before became the central areas of research. Methodology was 
fundamentally changed. All of this brought about a great in-
crease in our understanding of natural languages, eventually 
reincorporating the insights of earlier theories. 
Chomsky (1965:4 and 1966:9-10) introduced the notion 
of linguistic competence to explain exactly of what the gram-
mar is a theory. This notion of linguistic competence is an im-
portant contribution to understanding language and linguistics. 
But it has been less well received by philosophers than it 
should have been, in part because of certain false things Chom-
sky said (1965:3-7, 1972, and 1980: passim) about it. In 
particular, he said (1965: 3 and 1966: 12) that the grammar of 
a language, considered as a theory of competence, is an ideali-
zation, and that speakers know the rules of the correct gram-
mar of their language. In this paper, the notion of linguistic 
competence is explained in a way that makes clear what is 
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essential to the notion. This will make clear that Chomsky 
should not have said that a theory of competence is an ideali-
zation, and that there is no reason to say that a speaker knows 
the rules of the grammar. 
I 
Central to Chomsky's work was the idea that the grammar 
of a language should say exactly what the sentences of the 
language are and describe the linguistic properties of each of 
these sentences. 
There are infinitely many sentences in any natural lan-
guage. There is no longest sentence, since all speakers know 
many ways of extending any sentence to make a longer sen-
tence (and that means there are infinitely many). So the 
grammar cannot say what the sentences are by listing them. 
It is very natural to think that the grammar should be a sys-
tem of rules that produces or generates the infinitely many 
sentences of the language together with a linguistic descrip-
tion of each. This is the most obvious way of describing all 
of the items in an infinite collection. 
Once this point of view-that the grammar should gen-
erate in a precise way all and only the sentences of the lan-
guage-is adopted, it is actually a rather short step to the idea 
that a generative grammar of a natural language must contain 
rules of a rather special and unusual sort, called transforma-
tional rules. Thus, the grammar of a natural language is a trans-
formational generative grammar. 
Chomsky (1965,1972, and 1980) combined this with two 
philosophical views about linguistics. First, he saw linguistics 
as part of cognitive psychology. Linguistics aims at telling us 
something about the minds of language users. Knowing a lan-
guage is, after all, fundamentally a mental matter. And the 
ability to learn languages is a mental ability. 
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Second, Chomsky wanted to be a scientific realist about 
linguistic theory. Linguistic theory aims at describing some-
thing that exists in nature and is correct only insofar as there 
is a mental or psychological reality corresponding to it. 
Given these two things - the aim of describing all and only 
the sentences of, say, English, and the view that linguistic 
theory describes a mental reality -Chomsky faced questions 
that had not concerned linguists or philosophers of linguistic 
science for fifty years. 
The grammar generates infinitely many sentences. Speak-
ers, obviously, are finite. Most of the sentences generated by 
the grammar could not be used or understood by any speaker. 
This raises the question of how the grammar, with its infinite 
output, describes the finite mind of the speaker. 
On the other hand, the grammar is supposed to generate 
all and only sentences of English. But many of the things 
fluent speakers of English say when speaking English, such as 
false starts, changes of thought in mid-sentence, spoonerisms 
and slips of the tongue, Freudian and otherwise, are not sen-
tences of English, and therefore will not be in the output of 
the grammar. The speaker who says these things recognizes 
that they are not sentences of his language or dialect or 
idiolect.* These things will not be in the output of the gram-
mar. The grammar is supposed to say something real about 
speakers. Clearly, it does not say what speakers of English do 
when speaking English. 
This is where Chomsky's notion of linguistic competence 
enters the picture, and with it the distinction between per-
formance and competence. A speaker can use and understand 
sentences that he has never before used or heard. In fact, most 
of the sentences a person encounters are encountered only 
once. Furthermore, people can use and understand sentences 
that are longer than any they have previously used or under-
stood. Much linguistic information is brought to bear in 
understanding a sentence; for example, knowledge or recog-
nition of grammatical relations within the sentence. Consider, 
*There is an interesting, though relatively superficial, related point 
about data. The things English speakers say when speaking English 
certainly count as part of the data on which a grammar of English is 
constructed. But a good deal of what people speaking English pro-
duce-slips of the tongue etc.-is not in the output of the grammar. 
Thus, the theory does not "account for" at least some of the data on 
the basis of which it is constructed. 
(Note incidentally, that false starts, slips of the tongue, etc. are 
among the things children hear when they are learning a language. Only 
rarely, if at all, are they told that these are mistakes. But they learn the 
language in such a way that they end up knowing that such things are 
mistakes.) 
Nancy isn't going to watch Jane perform in the play, 
but she says it's okay of Ron does. 
"Ron" is understood as the grammatical subject of "watch" _ 
and not of "perform" or "say" -although the sentence does 
not say Ron watches, only that he is permitted to watch. A 
person has a great deal of grammatical information of this sort 
about any sentence he understands. 
Compare this with remembering telephone numbers. The 
telephone numbers a person remembers are stored in that 
person's mind in some way when he is not thinking of them 
and they can each be brought to consciousness, if everythin~ 
works right. Each number is stored as a separate item, dis-
tinct from the others. Something similar can be said about 
recognition of people, tunes, and so forth. 
Knowledge of the linguistic properties of sentences 
cannot be stored in the mind separately for each sentence. 
In the first place, one has not heard all the sentences that 
he will ever meet. More importantly, there are too many 
sentences that could be used and understood for all of them 
to be stored in the mind. [Miller (1965) said that by "conser-
vative calculation" there are at least 1020 sentences 20 words 
long.] 
Linguistic information about individual sentences is not 
stored. At the time a sentence is used or understood the speak-
er has a great deal of information about that sentence. That 
knowledge must be produced right then, on the spot, when 
needed, in response to certain stimuli. This holds for every 
sentence that is understood. The linguistic knowledge involved 
in understanding the sentence was not stored in the mind prior 
to hearing and understanding the sentence, but that knowledge 
exists. So, it was produced on the spot. This means that each 
speaker must have a mechanism, or system of processes or 
principles, that produces knowledge of items of English. It is 
just this that a speaker of English has and someone who does 
not know English does not have. This system, whatever it is, 
that produces linguistic knowledge on demand, is what Chom-
sky called linguistic competence, and this is what the grammar 
of a language attempts to characterize. 
But, of course, it does not always work. When a person is 
tired, or his attention divided, he may not understand sen-
tences that he would understand under other circumstances. 
What linguistic knowledge is actually produced at a given time 
depends on non-linguistic factors such as memory, motivation, 
attention, and the peripheral nervous system, factors that can 
be affected by fatigue, drugs, environment, etc. 
Thus, linguistic performance differs from time to time. 
The processes that produce linguistic knowledge remain the 
same; how they are utilized differs. So performance -what 
speakers actually do or can do - is contrasted with compe-
tence - the system of processes that produces the linguistic 
knowledge involved in speakers' linguistic doings. (In this 
dichotomy the term "performance" is used for two things. 
When linguistic performance is spoken of as data, it is what the 
speaker actually does. But theories of performance are general-
ly best understood as theories of a speaker's capacities to per-
ceive, understand, etc. under various conditions.) 
Now, the number of sentences one can understand under 
any given circumstances is large, but definitely limited. The 
processes that produce linguistic knowledge, on the other 
hand, can in principle lead to the understanding of any Eng-
lish sentence, no matter how complex. The processes are 
not limited. The speaker's use of them is limited by avail-
able time, memory, and so forth. For example, written sen-
tences may be understood that could not be understood 
spoken. Written the whole thing need not be stored in memory 
to go back and check the beginning. Memory aids increase 
the number of sentences a person can understand, but they 
do not increase the number of sentences in the language. 
They do not change the processes that produce linguistic 
knowledge. 
Compare arithmetic. What one knows about arithmetic 
implies infinitely many correct sums. One can do only a few of 
them. Use of pencil and paper increases considerably the 
number of computations one can perform. But buying a pencil 
does not increase knowledge of arithmetic. It increases the 
portion of knowledge that can be used. There is no theoretical 
limit to the extent to which memory aids can increase compu-
tational capacity. 
The analogy is misleading in some respects. But the point 
is, in the case of both language and arithmetic, the processes 
have by nature an infinite output. The available output is 
limited by the processing capacity of the total psychological 
system of which they are a part. 
II 
Speakers do not have stored linguistic knowledge concern-
ing individual sentences of their language. They have a great 
deal of linguistic information concerning the sentences they 
use and understand. It should, therefore, be uncontroversial 
that speakers produce linguistic knowledge concerning specific 
sentences when they are dealing with those sentences. And 
thus, it should be uncontroversial that there are some mechan-
isms or processes in speakers that produce this knowledge. 
Chomsky gave these mechanisms or processes the name "lin-
guistic competence," and takes their study as the purpose of 
linguistic theory. It should be obvious that they are a worthy 
object of study. 
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The observation that there must be such processes was an 
important contribution to the understanding of human lan-
guage and complex psychological phenomena in general. It 
is a more than reasonable conjecture that similar systems of 
competence are involved in many areas of human and animal 
activity -complex physical skills such as playing ping pong, 
driving an automobile, building a nest, and stalking prey, as 
well as areas like visual perception and the making of moral 
and aesthetic judgments. Any such system deserves to be called a 
cognitive system, because it produces cognitive states-percep-
tual states, belief states, or the like. 
The notion of competence came into linguistics with 
transformational grammar, and remains after the decline""-
disintegration -of classical transformational grammar, al-
though even in linguistics there is some reactionary criticism. 
But the notion has not achieved the prominence it deserves 
in cognitive psychology, outside of psycholinguistics. And it 
has come in for a good deal more abuse from philosophers 
than it deserves (cl, for example, Harman, 1967; Hiz, 1967; 
Stitch, 1971). 
One reason for this philosophical abuse lies in some things 
Chomsky said about linguistic competence. In particular, he 
said the grammar is an idealization, and that the speaker 
knows -albeit tacitly - the rules of the grammar. It would seem 
that these remarks cannot both be true. If it is an idealiza-
tion, then it does not characterize the actual speaker; in par-
ticular, it does not characterize his knowledge. But, in fact, 
they are both false. 
Chomsky (1965 :3) made the following fairly typical re-
mark about idealization: 
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal 
speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous 
speech-community, who knows its language perfectly 
and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant 
conditions as memory limitations, distractions, 
shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random 
or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the 
language in actual performance. 
There are two very different kinds of idealization involved 
here. When he said the ideal speaker is "unaffected by such 
grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, dis-
tractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random 
or characteristic) in applying his knowl~dge of the language in 
actual performance," this suggests that the grammar is a 
theory of possible performance, but for an ideal speaker, not 
for any actual speaker. An analogy from physical science 
would be the ideal gas laws, which relate pressure, volume, and 
temperature, Boyle's law, for example. Frictionless planes and 
perfectly rigid rods are others. These gas laws are ideal laws. 
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They do not describe the behavior of any actual volume of gas. 
They describe how a gas would behave under ideal conditions 
of -inter alia -molecular uniformity. But all gases deviate to 
some degree from uniform molecular composition-and hence 
from the ideal gas laws-depending on the gas, pressure, and 
temperature. 
This analogy might be tempting to someone who wants 
to be a realist about linguistic theory. A realist concerning 
physical theory will certainly regard the ideal gas laws as a 
proper scientific theory, although they do not describe the 
behavior of any actual object. They describe an ideal, to which 
the behavior of an actual object approximates more or less 
depending on conditions, and for this reason they can playa 
role in describing the behavior of certain actual objects. 
Similarly, a theory of linguistic competence does not 
describe the behavior of any actual speaker, but it does de-
scribe an ideal to which the behavioral capacities of actual 
speakers approximate, more or less depending on conditions, 
and hence, it plays a role in predicting their actual behavioral 
capacities. 
But it is a bad analogy. The theory of competence-the 
grammar-is not an idealization in the way the ideal gas laws 
are. The ideal gas laws do not aim at describing anything that 
exists in nature. In particular, they do not aim at describing 
something that exists in volumes of gas. But it is clear that 
Chomsky intended a theory of competence to aim at describ-
ing something that exists in each speaker. There are processes 
in each speaker that generate his actual linguistic knowledge-
when the rest of the system cooperates. The theory of compe-
tence aims at characterizing those very processes, not some 
ideal to which they approximate. 
So the linguistic theory of competence is not an idealiza-
tion in the sense that it is merely a theory of performance for 
an ideal speaker; that is, one without non-linguistic perform-
ance limitations. 
The other sort of idealization mentioned in this passage 
is quite different, and quite innocent. An ideal speaker is a 
speaker "in a homogeneous speech community, who knows its 
language perfectly." The linguist is typically interested in the 
language of a community, and small differences in vocabulary, 
pronunciation, or syntax are of little interest. For this reason, 
the linguist does not describe any particular speaker. He 
abstracts from these small differences. But the linguist could 
describe the linguistic competence of a particular speaker, 
with whatever idiosyncrasies it might have. Given time and 
patience enough, the linguistic competence of each member 
of the linguistic community could be described. So this kind 
of "idealization" is convenient, but hardly necessary or an 
interesting feature of linguistic theory. Furthermore, the 
fact that linguists ignore small differences among speakers 
does not help at all to explain what the grammar says about 
individual speakers. 
Chomsky said the grammar describes the speaker's knowl_ 
edge of his language. It is true that a person knows English if 
and only if he has a system of linguistic competence that 
generates knowledge of English sentences. But what does the 
speaker have when he has a system of linguistic competence? 
Chomsky said he has knowledge of the rules of the grammar. 
But, of course, the speaker cannot say what the rules of the 
grammar are -even under hypnosis, or psychoanalysis. So 
Chomsky said we have tacit (or unconscious) knowledge of 
the grammar. At places he said this both about the rules of the 
grammar and about the linguistic information that the gram-
mar generates-such as, that "Ron" is subject of "watch." 
What should be made of tacit knowledge? Locke said 
that he could not understand innate knowledge and innate 
ideas. Leibniz replied (Remnant and Bennett, 1980:1, i, 5) 
that not all acquired knowledge is conscious at once, that what 
is not conscious must be stored in the mind in some way, and 
that it was at least understandable that there should be unac-
quired knowledge represented in the mind in the same way at 
birth. 
This idea that information or beliefs must be represented 
in the mind in some way when not in use is the right way to 
think about the question of tacit knowledge. Many ordinary 
beliefs are represented in the mind when we are not thinking 
of them. We know that our knowledge of individual sentences 
is not represented in the mind except when the sentence is 
used or understood. If the rules that produce this knowledge 
are represented in the mind in much the same way as ordinary 
beliefs, then the speaker knows these rules. But if they are 
not, it is inappropriate to say the speaker knows the rules. 
Saying we have tacit knowledge of the rules of the gram-
mar amounts to saying we have representations of these rules 
similar to representations of beliefs, but that they cannot be 
brought to the surface the way familiar beliefs often can. 
There is one phenomenon that might make it seem that 
speakers have tacit knowledge of the output of the grammar. 
Consider, for example, the sentence, "Time flies." This sen-
tence is ambiguous. At first, most speakers recognize only the 
sense of the cliche, as in "My how time flies." They do not 
recognize that this sentence is also an imperative that might 
be used to give a command to an official at the insect races. It 
is not necessary to explain the imperative sense to a speaker 
who has not recognized that sense. It suffices to suggest an -
appropriate context. For this reason, it might be thought that 
this latter sense was known all along but required a reminder" 
to be recalled, the way the first line of a song or poem can~ 
bring back the entire work. Such a conclusion would not be 
correct, however. Knowledge of the imperative sense of "Time 
flies" is not stored in the mind like the poem would have been. 
It is certainly not the case that every sentence that a person 
can understand with prompting is stored in the mind. Knowl-
edge of what "Time flies" means was not given the reader. It 
was produced as if inferred from knowledge of the language 
when the reader was put in the right frame of mind. Indeed, 
some philosophers (e.g., Graves et aI., 1973) have used this as 
an argument for tacit knowledge of the rules of the language. 
That from which the specific knowledge has inferred must 
have been known. 
But this is not the right picture either. This knowledge 
was not inferred although it was produced. Imagine a com-
puter that derives sentences using a transformational grammar. 
It is turned on and just starts churning out what that grammar 
claims are sentences. This might be done to examine the 
output, as a test of the grammar. Such things have been done. 
If this were to be done today, it would be on some big, general-
purpose computer with a program containing the rules of the 
grammar. The rules would be represented at some point in the 
program. 
Suppose a special-purpose computer just to generate sen-
tences by this grammar were to be built. The rules of the gram-
mar would not have to be represented. The machine could be 
constructed so that it would act in accordance with the rules 
but not contain a representation of the rules. Similarly, a 
simple arithmetic calculator operates in accordance with the 
rules of arithmetic but does not contain a representation of 
addition and multiplication tables. These tables are not written 
in the calculator in any form. If it is an electronic calculator, 
it does binary arithmetic. There must be a structure that takes 
° and ° and gives 0, takes ° andl and gives 1, etc. But nowhere 
in the machine does it say, "0 plus ° is 0," etc. 
So a person is (in part) a device that generates linguistic 
knowledge and must contain structures that operate in ac-
cordance with the rules of its grammar. But it does not follow 
that a representation of those rules is contained in the person. 
It is possible that they are. That is an empirical question. But 
the notion of competence does not demand that they are. In 
fact, if Chomsky was right in his insistence that human beings 
are, so far as language is concerned, special purpose devices, 
it would seem most likely that they do not contain representa-
tions of the rules. If not, it is inappropriate to say that they 
have tacit knowledge of the rules of the grammar. 
It should not be concluded that the speaker knows the 
rules or the output of the grammar of his language. The gram-
mar does characterize the knowledge of the speaker in one 
way. It says what linguistic knowledge the speaker will have, 
given the right circumstances. But it does not do just that. 
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Realists about linguistic theory should say that it also aims at 
characterizing the inner processes by which this linguistic 
knowledge is generated when the speaker does have it. In a 
grammar a sentence has a certain derivation, a sequence of 
structures determined by the rules of the grammar, including 
the particular structures that characterize the linguistic knowl-
edge a speaker has about that sentence. If the grammar is 
correct, a concrete realization of the structures in that se-
quence should occur in the mind of the speaker when he uses 
or understands that sentence. 
In pointing out the existence of this cognitive system 
which he called linguistic competence -and the existence of 
others like it -Chomsky made a significant contribution t6 
understanding of language and other complex psychological 
phenomena. He pointed out something real and important. 
But this contribution has been less readily accepted than it 
should have been because of some false things Chomsky said 
about linguistic competence. Among these, of particular inter-
est is the occasional claim that a theory of competence is an 
idealization, and the persistent claim that speakers know 
(tacitly) the rules of their language-that is, the true theory of 
competence of their language. But a theory of competence is 
not an idealization in any sense relevant to Chomsky'S pur-
poses. It is not necessary that speakers know or believe the 
rules of their language in order for the grammar to describe 
some real aspect of the speaker. 
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